08.06.07

Free Agent Scorecard

Posted in Baseball at 3:21 pm by Valentine

“That bum! I can’t believe they gave him $30 million!” It is hard to comprehend the magnitude of some of the deals in major league baseball, especially in light of the mediocre performances they often buy. Yet the free agent market is the primary avenue by which the wealthiest teams can convert their riches into on-field success. If the Red Sox or Yankees were to turn their back on free agents entirely, they would need to compete on an even basis with the Oakland and Minnesota franchises. While that might be more satisfying on some level, it undoubtedly would hurt their playoff chances.

The Red Sox were active players in the 2006-2007 market, acquiring three front-line players for a total cost of over $200 million. How do these contracts compare on a “value” basis to the other major free agent signings last winter? There were fourteen deals in excess of $30 million. I will analyze each briefly using some basic “rate” statistics (BA/OBP/SLG for hitters, ERA/WHIP for pitchers) as well as using WARP3, an estimate of the overall offensive/defensive/pitching value that a player brings to a team compared to a “replacement player” that you might freely acquire in the minors.

The contracts…

EXCELLENT VALUES (thus far)

Gary Matthews Jr, $50M/5yr, .275/.339/.447, +7.0 WARP3, $1.4M/W

  • Rationale: With Chone Figgins moving back to the infield, the Angels needed a CF to fill the void. A team that builds around defense and aggressive baserunning, Matthews fit their needs nicely.
  • Results: Matthews had a career year in 2006, hitting .313 despite peripherals that showed no fundamental change in his game. Nobody should be surprised that his batting average fell back to career norms this year, pulling his OBP and SLG with it. In fact, his secondary average (OBP-BA + SLG-BA) has been rock-solid consistent since 2004. His defensive reputation is perhaps overblown, but he has played an above-average center field with flashes of brilliance. There have been no complaints on that count!
  • Outlook: The greater concern with the Matthews deal was not his 2007 performance, but his ability to sustain this production through his mid-thirties. He is rapidly approaching the age where year-over-year comparisons are likely to show a steady decline. He could easily end up as a very expensive bench player, however the Angels should be satisfied with the deal if he keeps his current production for even two more years.

Aramis Ramirez, $75M/5yr, .318/.360/.547, +8.7 WARP3, $1.7M/W

  • Rationale: This deal was widely acknowledged as a “hometown discount”, with negotiations that felt more like those for a contract extension. Ramirez didn’t want to leave, he simply wanted a raise to some approximation of
    his market value. Knowing that it could take 50% more to replace his production with another free agent, the Cubs were happy to oblige.
  • Results: Aramis Ramirez continues to be one of the leading sluggers in the majors. Surprisingly, he is also playing the best defense of his career. In prior years that was always a concern.
  • Outlook: Ramirez isn’t getting any younger, and injuries may eventually force him to move off the hot corner. Still, it is hard to imagine this deal being anything other than a win for the Cubs (and their long-suffering fans).

Gil Meche, $55M/5yr, 3.70 ERA, 1.288 WHIP, +6.4 WARP3, $1.7M/W

  • Rationale: The new CBA encourages small-market teams to spend more money, yet what free agent wants to come to Kansas City? Many teams were scared off by Meche’s lack of consistency. The Royals, perhaps because they had no alternatives, chose to overlook those flaws.
  • Results: Meche has dramatically improved his control this year, resulting in a breakout season. Look past that win-loss and he is among the better pitchers in the league. A bargain at $11M/yr!
  • Outlook: How can one ever be certain that an inconsistent pitcher has learned consistency? Yet at his age, and with his “stuff”, Meche is a reasonable bet to sustain this improvement. Kudos to the Royals for an excellent call on a pitcher nobody else wanted to touch.

Alfonso Soriano, $136M/8yr, .299/.338/.516, +8.9 WARP3, $1.9 M/W

  • Rationale: Clearly the premier position player on the market (aside from Aramis Ramirez), Soriano promised to make the Cubs immediately competitive in the weak NL Central. And as the Cardinals proved last year, once you make the World Series you have a chance to go all the way.
  • Results: Though his power numbers are down from his 2006 spike, Soriano has met any reasonable expectations. He is matching his career offensive averages while playing excellent defense in the outfield. What more can you ask?
  • Outlook: More than any other recent free agent, the length of the deal is a greater issue than the annualized dollar figure. Are the Cubs are betting that he’ll continue to be a top hitter throughout his thirties? Or do they believe that short-term success will do more to boost the sale price of the team than the magnitude of long-term commitments will hurt?

Ted Lilly, $40M/4yr, 3.60 ERA, 1.119 WHIP, +5.4 WARP3, $1.9M/W

  • Rationale: An established veteran, Lilly has been generally successful throughout his career. While you might hesitate to write him in at the top of a rotation, he is an excellent #3 or #4 starter. Despite a reputation for fragility, he has made 30+ starts in four out of the last five seasons.
  • Results: Like Meche, Lilly is throwing more strikes this year. Still, the greater change in his ERA is due to the lesser level of competition in the NL Central as well as the absence of the DH.
  • Outlook: I would not be surprised to see Lilly suffer a career-ending injury before the completion of this deal, yet the same can be said of nearly any pitcher. Even a couple successful seasons like this one will justify the signing.

TOP DOLLAR (for pretty good players)

Carlos Lee, $100M/6yr, .295/.350/.521, +6.3 WARP3, $2.6M/W

  • Rationale: Looking for a “run producer” to strengthen their lineup, the Astros turned to Lee after being outbid on Soriano.
  • Results: Lee continues to hit the ball as solidly as ever, so in that sense the Astros are getting their money worth. Unfortunately his defense continues to be very poor. Compare his WARP3 to Matthews and Soriano, and you have to second-guess their tunnel vision. It would have made more sense to pay a premier price for the premier player (Soriano) or to pay a second-tier price for a second-tier player (Matthews).
  • Outlook: If Lee is weak defensively now, how bad will he be five more years down the road? If Lee can successfully transition to first base, Houston will likely end up with a reasonable return on this deal. If not, he will do as much to hurt their run prevention as he does to help their offense. Either way, they need to rebuild before they can once again be competitive. They should consider trading Lee to a team with more immediate playoff prospects.

Daisuke Matsuzaka, $103**M/5yr, 3.75 ERA, 1.271 WHIP, +7.7 WARP3, $2.7 M/W
**Half as a “posting fee”, not subject to the luxury tax.

  • Rationale: When you have as much money to spend as the Red Sox and Yankees, you begin every job search by asking, “Who is the best available?” Despite some uncertainty about how well his performance would translate from Japan to MLB, Matsuzaka was clearly the best available pitcher.
  • Results: Matsuzaka is 15th among MLB starters in SNLVAR (support neutral value added above replacement), in a virtual tie with Roy Oswalt and five slots ahead of teammate Josh Beckett because of the latter’s DL stint. I’ll let others worry about whether this performance is “worth” $20M/yr. He’s definitely somebody I want on my team.
  • Outlook: It is always risky to guarantee a pitcher that much money, for that many years, though Matsuzaka is less of an injury risk than most. He may improve slightly as he continues to adjust, but what you see is likely what you get — a solid staff ace.

REMIND ME WHY WE MADE THESE GUYS RICH?

Juan Pierre, $44M/5yr, .277/.314/.333, +3.3 WARP3, $2.7M/W

  • Rationale: The Dodgers were looking to replace Kenny Lofton in center field and at the top of their lineup. Pierre is younger than Lofton and just as fast.
  • Results: Exactly what you could have expected from his career numbers. Despite a high batting average, Pierre is not particularly good at getting on base. Despite terrific speed, he is not particularly skilled defensively. The Dodgers could have done far better at filling their real need (a quality defensive center-fielder) if they had not insisted that he also be a plus basestealer.
  • Outlook: This deal could be the difference between making the playoffs in 2007 and falling short. Is that not penalty enough? Yet experience suggests that Pierre is likely to age poorly. Too much of his value is tied to his athleticism, too little from “skill”. In two or three years he may have declined to the point where he is not even worth a roster spot on the bench.

Julio Lugo, $36M/4yr, .222/.288/.324, +3.1 WARP3, $2.9M/W

  • Rationale: Lugo was the best shortstop of a very thin free-agent class. The Red Sox best alternative would have been to promote Alex Cora to a starting role. While I love him as a reserve, that is not a great “Plan B”. Alex Gonzalez might have worked out well in the short-term, but I was hesitant to commit to the three years he got from the Reds.
  • Results: His defense has been better than advertised, but his offense evaporated for over two months. I have never seen a player struggle so badly, especially not without an injury as an excuse. Lugo is hitting very well in the month since the All-Star Break, however, so there is hope.
  • Outlook: He can’t hit any worse, right? His contract is not a major stumbling block for the Red Sox, though I will be disappointed if they allow him to block the red-hot Jed Lowrie (once the latter is ready, perhaps in the second half of 2008). We may see a reprise of the Renteria deal, in which the Red Sox leverage their wealth to shed a disappointing contract and pick up a prospect they can use to address another need.

Jeff Suppan, $42M/4yr, 4.97 ERA, 1.543 WHIP, +3.1 WARP3, $3.4M/W

  • Rationale: The Brewers needed a veteran innings-eater and could not afford to compete for Zito or Matsuzaka. In hindsight they might have pursued Ted Lilly more aggressively, since they ended up spending just as much for a less talented pitcher.
  • Results: Other than some ill-fated attempts at the American League, Suppan has been very consistent. Once you take park effects into account, Suppan’s 2007 line is almost identical to his 2004-2006 lines with St. Louis.
  • Outlook: Suppan has never been much of a strikeout pitcher, yet he continues to lose ground in this department. At 4.5 K/9 and 1.43 K/BB, Suppan is very close to the point where he will no longer be able to compensate with wiles.

SO MUCH MONEY, SO LITTLE PRODUCTION

JD Drew, $70M/5yr, .245/.351/.371, +2.8 WARP3, $5.0M/W

  • Rationale: The Fenway right field requires a player with better-than-average defensive range, in addition to the throwing arm that generally distinguishes right fielders from their counterparts across the diamond. Of the few available candidates, Drew seemed to offer the best hope for power. His patience at the plate definitely seemed to fit the Red Sox philosophy. Oh, and because of a quirk in his prior contract he did not cost the Red Sox any draft-pick compensation.
  • Results: Absolutely dreadful thus far. Drew is hitting 25 to 40 points below his career norms, with erratic defense, frequent injuries, and almost no power. Most fans would love to replace him — yet how can you move a $70M player in the first year of a multi-year deal?
  • Outlook: I can easily imagine his batting average rebounding, ultimately improving his averages to something like .280/.380/.420. It takes more than a little Kool-Aid to see that power returning, however. The Red Sox may have replaced Trot Nixon more literally than they intended.

Barry Zito, $126M/7yr, 5.12 ERA, 1.484 WHIP, +2.3 WARP3, $7.8 M/W

  • Rationale: Needing to replace Jason Schmidt at the top of their rotation, the Giants turned to a young, durable, lefty. Zito came with impeccable credentials, including a Cy Young Award, three All-Star appearances, a career 3.55 ERA, thirty wins over the past two seasons… What wouldn’t you pay to add a pitcher like that?
  • Results: In 2006, Zito’s line “translates” to 8.3 H/9, 1.0 HR/9, 3.8 BB/9, and 5.9 K/9. This year his line translates to 8.7 H/9, 1.0 HR/9, 3.7 BB/9, and 5.8 K/9. Zito has been an exceptionally consistent pitcher since 2004, showing only a slight increase in walks and a slight decrease in strikeouts. Yet his ERAs over that period are 4.48, 3.86, 3.83, and 5.08. For two consecutive years, Zito produced *actual* ERAs that were substantially superior to his *peripheral* ERAs. Luck? Skill? Either way, that feat is difficult to replicate. This year the weakness in his peripheral stats caught up with (and mauled) Zito.
  • Outlook: Over the short term, it is easy to imagine Zito continuing to replicate those peripherals, likely with an ERA in the mid-fours. In the long run, the slow decline in his strikeout rate is likely to catch up with him. Very few pitchers are a good risk on a five year deal, let alone a seven year deal.

Jason Schmidt, $47M/3yr, 6.31 ERA, 1.792 WHIP, +0.2 WARP3, $InfM/W

  • Rationale: Aside from Matsuzaka, Schmidt was seen as the best free agent pitcher on the market. Despite some velocity troubles in early 2005, he was consistently good for 29+ starts and a plus win-loss. There is no gutsier pitcher in the game.
  • Results: The shoulder problems that cost him velocity in 2005 returned with a vengeance, ultimately requiring extensive surgery to repair. The 2007 season was a complete loss.
  • Outlook: Don’t count him out for 2008, but Schmidt is unlikely to fully recover his form. It would take a miracle for him to return value on this contract.

Vicente Padilla, $34M/3yr, 6.69 ERA, 1.810 WHIP, +0.0 WARP3, $InfM/W

  • Rationale: One of the younger pitchers on the market, Padilla was good for 200 innings and 15 wins in 2006.
  • Results: The “bicep tendinitis” that bothered him in 2004 came back, perhaps explaining his decreased effectiveness? Padilla has generally been an effective pitcher when healthy, but he has so often been injured that the phrase has little meaning.
  • Outlook: I’m not a doctor, but serious recurrent problems often seem to lead to surgery. He reminds me a little of Matt Clement.

HOW MANY DOLLARS PER PITCH DOES HE MAKE?

Roger Clemens, $17.4M/ 4mo, 4.23 ERA, 1.318 WHIP, ~3.2 WARP?, $5.4M/W

  • Rationale: A streak of freak injuries in April (plus the expected disappearance of Pavano) exposed the vulnerable underbelly of this Yankees team. How many difference-makers are available at any price in May?
  • Results: Clemens has been pretty effective, largely duplicating the results from his previous tour with the Yankees. While that has not shown in the “win” column, yet, it is hard to blame Clemens for that.
  • Outlook: It appears increasingly likely that the Yankees will win the Wild Card and make the playoffs. That is clearly worth $17M to Steinbrenner, so you have to consider it “money well spent”. The absence of long-term complications makes it an especially attractive “one night stand”.

CONCLUSION

The free agent market is an awfully expensive (and risky!) way to add talent. Fully half the deals must be considered a disappointment in their first year, a ratio that is unlikely to improve with time. These teams didn’t merely overpay. They installed a player who contributes little or nothing to the team effort, potentially preventing a more productive player from taking over. With this in mind, I would like to propose some guidelines for signing free agents:

  1. Be cognizant of injury risks. Both Schmidt and Padilla had a recent history of injuries, directly related to their current problems. Sign riskier players only to short- or performance-triggered deals, perhaps using vesting options to reduce the risk of an early injury destroying the value of a contract.
  2. Focus on metrics with predictive merit, not those that describe past performance. In Zito’s case, a quick glance at his 2004-2006 peripherals should have been enough to scare anybody away from offering him more than a $50M deal.
  3. Don’t lock yourself in to a specific profile when looking for a position player. You mayprefer a slick-fielding shortstop, but not if in doing so you lock your future to a Mendoza-level hitter. Similarly, you may be better off with a well-rounded athlete rather than a lumbering slugger in left field.
  4. Better to overpay for a great player than to sign a mediocre player at a proportionally bloated price. Mediocre players can be replaced cheaply on short deals that do not limit your future.

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